And to this I added that,since Iknew some perfections which I did not possess,I was not the only being in existence (I will here,with your permission,freely use the terms of the schools);but,on the contrary,that there was of necessity some other more perfect Being upon whom I was dependent,and from whom I had received all that I possessed;for if I had existed alone,and independently of every other being,so as to have had from myself all the perfection,however little,which I actually possessed,I should have been able,for the same reason,to have had from myself the whole remainder of perfection,of the want of which I was conscious,and thus could of myself have become infinite,eternal,immutable,omniscient,all-powerful,and,in fine,have possessed all the perfections which I could recognize in God.For in order to know the nature of God (whose existence has been established by the preceding reasonings),as far as my own nature permitted,I had only to consider in reference to all the properties of which I found in my mind some idea,whether their possession was a mark of perfection;and I was assured that no one which indicated any imperfection was in him,and that none of the rest was awanting.Thus Iperceived that doubt,inconstancy,sadness,and such like,could not be found in God,since I myself would have been happy to be free from them.
Besides,I had ideas of many sensible and corporeal things;for although Imight suppose that I was dreaming,and that all which I saw or imagined was false,I could not,nevertheless,deny that the ideas were in reality in my thoughts.But,because I had already very clearly recognized in myself that the intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal,and as I observed that all composition is an evidence of dependency,and that a state of dependency is manifestly a state of imperfection,I therefore determined that it could not be a perfection in God to be compounded of these two natures and that consequently he was not so compounded;but that if there were any bodies in the world,or even any intelligences,or other natures that were not wholly perfect,their existence depended on his power in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single moment.
I was disposed straightway to search for other truths and when I had represented to myself the object of the geometers,which I conceived to be a continuous body or a space indefinitely extended in length,breadth,and height or depth,divisible into divers parts which admit of different figures and sizes,and of being moved or transposed in all manner of ways (for all this the geometers suppose to be in the object they contemplate),I went over some of their simplest demonstrations.And,in the first place,I observed,that the great certitude which by common consent is accorded to these demonstrations,is founded solely upon this,that they are clearly conceived in accordance with the rules I have already laid down In the next place,I perceived that there was nothing at all in these demonstrations which could assure me of the existence of their object:
thus,for example,supposing a triangle to be given,I distinctly perceived that its three angles were necessarily equal to two right angles,but I did not on that account perceive anything which could assure me that any triangle existed:while,on the contrary,recurring to the examination of the idea of a Perfect Being,I found that the existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle,or as in the idea of a sphere,the equidistance of all points on its surface from the center,or even still more clearly;and that consequently it is at least as certain that God,who is this Perfect Being,is,or exists,as any demonstration of geometry can be.
