There is then no mystery about social consciousness.The view that there is something recondite about it and that it must be dug for with metaphysics and drawn forth from the depths of speculation， springs from a failure to grasp adequately the social nature of all higher consciousness.
What we need in this connection is only a better seeing and understanding of rather ordinary and familiar facts.
We may view social consciousness either in a particular mind or as a cooperative activity of many minds.The social ideas that I have are closely connected with those that other people have， and act and react upon them to form a whole.This gives us public consciousness， or to usc a more familiar term， public opinion， in the broad sense of a group state of mind which is more or less distinctly aware of itself.By this last phrase I mean such a mutual understanding of one another's points of view on the part of the individuals or groups concerned as naturally results from discussion.There are all degrees of this awareness in the various individuals.Generally speaking， it never embraces the whole in all its complexity， but almost always some of the relations that enter into the whole.The more intimate the communication of a group the more complete， the more thoroughly knit together into a living whole， is its public consciousness.
In a congenial family life， for example， there may be a public consciousness which brings all the important thoughts and feelings of the members into such a living and cooperative whole.In the mind of each member， also， this same thing exists as a social consciousness embracing a vivid sense of the personal traits and modes of thought and feeling of the other members.And， finally， quite inseparable from all this， is each one's consciousness of himself， which is largely a direct reflection of the ideas about himself he attributes to the others， and is directly or indirectly altogether a product of social life.Thus all consciousness hangs together， and the distinctions are chiefly based on point of view.
The unity of public opinion， like all vital unity， is one not of agreement but of organization， of interaction and mutual influence.
It is true that a certain underlying likeness of nature is necessary in order that minds may influence one another and so cooperate in forming a vital whole， but identity， even in the simplest process， is unnecessary and probably impossible.The consciousness of the American House of Representatives， for example， is by no means limited to the common views， if there are any， shared by its members， but embraces the whole consciousness of every member so far as this deals with the activity of the House.It would be a poor conception of the whole which left out the opposition， or even one dissentient individual.That all minds are different is a condition， not an obstacle， to the unity that consists in a differentiated and cooperative life.
Here is another illustration of what is meant by individual and collective aspects of social consciousness.Some of us possess a good many books relating to social questions of the day.Each of these books， considered by itself， is the expression of a particular social consciousness； the author has cleared up his ideas as well as he can and printed them.But a library of such books expresses social consciousness in a larger sense； it speaks for the epoch.And certainly no one who reads the books will doubt that they form a whole， whatever their differences.
The radical and the reactionist are clearly part of the same general situation.
There are， then， at least three aspects of consciousness which we may usefully distinguish： self-consciousness， or what I think of myself； social consciousness (in its individual aspect)， or what I think of other people； and public consciousness， or a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicating group.And all three are phases of a single whole.
EndnotesDiscourse on Method， part iv.6 There is much interest and significance in the matter of children's first learning the use of "I" and other self-words梛ust how they learn them and what they mean by them.Some discussion of the matter， based on observation of two children， will be found in Human Nature and the Social Order； and more recently I have published a paper in the Psychological Review (November， 1908) called A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child." I " seems to mean primarily the assertion of will in a social medium of which the child is conscious and of which his " I " is an inseparable part.It is thus a social idea and， as stated in the text， arises by differentiation of a vague body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one phase and social consciousness in another.It has no necessary reference to the body.
