SOME PHASES OF THE LARGER WILL GROWING EFFICIENCY OF THE INTELLECTUALPROCESSES -- ORGANIC IDEALISM -- THE LARGER MORALITY -- INDIRECT SERVICE-- INCREASING SIMPLICITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE -- PUBLICWILL SAVES PART OF THE COST OF CHANGE -- HUMAN NATURE THE GUIDING FORCEBEHIND PUBLIC WILL.
THE main source of a more effective public will is to be sought not， peculiarly， in the greater activity of government， but in the growing efficiency of the intellectual and moral processes as a whole.
This general striving of the public mind toward clearer consciousness is too evident to escape any observer. In every province of life a multiform social knowledge is arising and， mingling with the higher impulses of human nature， is forming a system of rational ideals， which through leadership and emulation gradually work their way into practice.
Compare， for instance， the place now taken in our universities by history， economics， political science， sociology and the like with the attention given them， say， in 1875， when in fact some of these studies had no place at all. Or consider the multiplication since the same date of government bureaus梖ederal， state and local梬hose main function is to collect， arrange and disseminate social knowledge. It is not too much to say that governments are becoming， more and more， vast laboratories of social science. Observe， also， the number of books and period-(412)-icals seriously devoted to these subjects. No doubt much of this work is feverish and shallow梐s must be expected in a time of change梑ut there is， on the whole， nothing more certain or more hopeful than the advance in the larger self-knowledge of mankind.
One result of this clearer consciousness is that idealism is coming to be organic； that is to say each particular ideal is coming to be formed and pursued in subordination to a system of ideals based on a large perception of fact. While putting a special enthusiasm into his own work， the idealist is learning that he needs to have also a general understanding of every good work， and of the whole to which all contribute.
For him to imagine that his is the only work worth doing is as unfortunate as for the captain of a company to imagine that he is conducting the whole campaign. Other things equal， the most effective idealists are those who are most sane， and who have a sense for the complication， interdependence and inertia of human conditions.
A study of the ideals and programmes that have had most acceptance even in recent years would make it apparent that our state of mind regarding society has been much like that which prevailed regarding the natural world when men sought the philosopher's stone and the fountain of perpetual youth. Much energy has been wasted， or nearly wasted， in the exclusive and intolerant advocacy of special schemes梥ingle tax， prohibition， state socialism and the like梕ach of which was imagined by its adherents to be the key to millennial conditions. Every year， however， makes converts to the truth that no isolated scheme can be (413) a good scheme， and that real progress must be an advance all along the line. Those who see only one thing can never see that truly， and so must work， even at that， in a somewhat superficial and erratic manner.
For similar reasons our moral schemes and standards must grow larger and more commensurate with the life which they aim to regulate. [1] The higher will can never work out unless it is as intelligently conceived and organized as commerce and politics. Evidently if we do not see how life really goes and what good and ill are under actual conditions， we can neither inculcate nor follow the better courses. There is nothing for it but to learn to feel and to effectuate kinds of right involving a sense of wider and remoter results than men have been used to take into account. As fast as science enables us to trace the outcome of a given sort of action we must go on to create a corresponding sense of responsibility for that outcome.
The popular systems of ethics are wholly inadequate， and all thinking persons are coming to see that those traits of decency in the obvious relations of life that we have been accustomed to regard as morality are in great part of secondary importance. Many of them are of somewhat the same character as John Woolman's refusal to wear dyed hats梬e wonder that people do not see something more important to exercise their consciences upon. When the larger movements of life were subconscious and the good and ill Bowing from them were (414) ascribed to an inscrutable providence， morality could not be concerned with them； but the more we understand them the more they must appear the chief field for its activity.
We still have to do with obvious wrong梩he drunkard， the housebreaker， the murderer， and the like梑ut these simple offences are easy to deal with， comparatively， as being evident and indubitable， so that all normal people condemn them. No great ability or organization upholds them； they are like the outbreaks of savages or children in that they do not constitute a formidable menace to society. And， moreover， we are coming to see that they are most effectually dealt with by indirect and preventive methods.
The more dangerous immorality is， of course， that which makes use of the latest engines of politics or commerce to injure the community.
Wrong-doers of this kind are usually decent and kindly in daily walk and conversation， as well as supporters of the church and other respectable institutions. For the most part they are not even hypocrites， but men of a dead and conventional virtue， not awake to the real meaning of what they are and do. A larger morality requires that they should be waked up， that a public conscience， based on knowledge， should judge things by their true results， and should know how to make its judgments effectual.
Moreover， this is not a matter merely of the bad men whom we read about in the newspapers， but one of personal guilt in all of us.
