THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WILL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WILL -- THE LACK OF PUBLIC WILL -- SOCIALWRONGS COMMONLY NOT WILL AT ALL
WHAT I shall say about Public Will梬hich is only another phase of the Democratic Mind梞ight well have been introduced under Part III； but I put it here because in a sense it rounds off our whole inquiry， involving some general conclusions as to the method and possibility of social betterment.
By public will we may understand the deliberate selfdirection of any social group. There is， of course， nothing mysterious about it， for it is of the same nature as public opinion， and is simply that so informed and organized as to be an effective guide to the life of the group. Nor can we say just when this state is reached梚t is a matter of degree梑ut we may assume that when a group intelligently pursues a steadfast policy some measure， at least， of public will has been achieved. Many savage tribes have it in a small way； the Jews developed it under the leadership of Moses and Joshua； the mediaeval church and the Venetian aristocracy displayed it. It is capable， like individual will， of indefinite improvement in insight， stability and scope.
Just as public and private opinion are general and (396) particular phases of the same thing， so will is a single complex activity with individual and collective aspects. But there is this difference between public and private will梛ust as there is between other individual and collective phases of mind梩hat the activity usually appears le~s conscious when looked at in its larger aspect than when considered in detail. I mean that we generally know a great deal better what we are about as individuals than we do as members of large wholes： when one sits down to dinner he is conscious of hunger and has a will to appease it；but if his action has any bearing upon the community， as no doubt it has， he is unaware of the fact. In the same way the activities of business have much consciousness and purpose when looked at in detail， but little when taken collectively. A thousand men buy and sell in the market， each with a very definite intention regarding his own transaction， but the market price which results from their bargaining is an almost mechanical outcome， not a matter of conscious intention at all. On the other hand， there are conscious wholes in which the general result may be as clearly purposed as the particular； as when an intelligent crew is working a vessel， each attending to his own work but understanding perfectly what the general purpose is and how he is contributing to it.
So if we restrict the word will to that which shows reflective consciousness and purpose there is a sense in which a certain choice (as of the purchaser in the market) may express individual will but not public will： there is a public side to it， of course， but of an involuntary sort.
We must remember， also， that although large wholes are， as a rule， much inferior to individuals in explicit con-(397)-sciousness and purpose， they are capable of rational structure and action of a somewhat mechanical sort far transcending that of the individual mind. This is because of the vast scope and indefinite duration they may have， which enables them to store up and systematize the work of innumerable persons， as a nation does， or even an industrial corporation. A large whole may and usually does display in its activity a kind of rationality or adaptation of means to ends which， as a whole， was never planned or purposed by anybody， but is the involuntary result of innumerable special endeavors. Thus the British colonial empire， which looks like the result of deliberate and farsighted policy， is conceded to have been， for the most part， the unforeseen outcome of personal enterprise.
An institution， as we have seen in previous chapters， is not fully human， but may， nevertheless， be superhuman， in the sense that it may express a wisdom beyond the grasp of any one man. And even in a moral aspect it is by no means safe to assume that the personal is superior to the collective.
This may or may not be the case， depending， among other things， upon whether there has been a past growth of collective moral judgment upon the point in question. The civil law， for example， which is the result of such a growth， is for the most part a much safer guide regarding property rights than the untrained judgment of any individual.
But after all public thought and will have the same superiority over unconscious adaptation (wonderful as the results of that often are)as private thought and will have over mere instinct and habit. They represent a higher principle of coordination and adaptation， one which， (398) properly employed， saves energy and prevents mistakes.
The British may have succeeded on instinct， but probably they would have succeeded better if more reason had been mixed with it； and the latter may save them from the decay which has attacked other great empires.
It is quite plain that the social development of the past has been mostly blind and without human intention.
Any page of history will show that men have been unable to foresee， much less to control， the larger movements of life. There have been seers， but they have had only flashes of light， and have almost never been men of immediate sway. Even great statesmen have lived in the present， feeling their way， and having commonly no purpose beyond the aggrandizement of their country or their order. Such partial exceptions as the framing of the American constitution by the light of history and philosophy， and with some prevision of its actual working， are confined to recent times and excite a special wonder.
