INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL -- (CONTINUED) INNOVATION AS A PERSONAL TENDENCY -- INNOVATION AND CONSERVATISMAS PUBLIC HABIT -- SOLIDARITY -- FRENCH AND ANGLO-SAXON SOLIDARITY -- TRADITIONAND CONVENTION -- NOT SO OPPOSITE AS THEY APPEAR -- REAL DIFFERENCE， INTHISREGARD， BETWEEN MODERN AND MEDIAEVAL SOCIETY -- TRADITIONALISM AND CONVENTIONALISMIN MODERN LIFE
THE time-worn question of conservatism as against change has evidently much in common with that of personality as against institutions. Innovation， that is， is bound up with the assertion of fresh personality against mechanism；and the arguments for and against it are the same as I have already suggested.
Wherever there is vigor and constructive power in the individual there is likely to be discontent with the establishment. The young notoriously tend to innovation， and so do those of a bold and restless temperament at any age； the old， on the contrary， the quiet， the timid， are conservative.
And so with whole peoples； in so far as they are enfeebled by climate or other causes they become inert and incapable of constructive change.
What may not be quite so obvious， at least to those who have not read M. Tarde's work on the Laws of Imitation， [1]
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is that innovation or the opposite may be a public habit， independently of differences in age or vigor. The attitude toward change is subject to the same sort of alteration as public opinion， or any other phase of the public mind. That a nation has moved for centuries in the deepest ruts of conservatism， like China or India， is no proof of a lack of natural vigor， but may mean only that the social type has matured and hardened in isolation， not encountering any influence pungent enough to pierce its shell and start a cycle of change. Thus it is now ap parent that lack of incitement， not lack of capacity， was the cause of the backwardness of Japan， and there is little doubt that the same is true of China.
Energy and suggestion are equally indispensable to all human achievement.
In the absence of the latter the mind easily spends itself in minor activities， and there is no reason why this should not be true of a whole people and continue for centuries. Then， again， a spark may set it on fire and produce in a few years pregnant changes in the structure of society. The physical law of the persistence of energy in uniform quantity is a most illusive one to apply to human life. There is always a great deal more mental energy than is utilized， and the amount that is really productive depends chiefly on the urgency of suggestion. Indeed， the higher activities of the human mind are， in general， more like a series of somewhat fortuitous explosions than like the work of a uniform force.
There may also be a habit of change that is mere restlessness and has no constructive significance. In the early history of America a conspicuous character on the frontier was the man who had the habit of moving on (329) He would settle for two or three years in one locality and then， getting restless， sell out and go on to another. So at present， those whom ambition and circumstance， in early manhood， have driven rapidly from one thing to another， often continue into old age the habit so acquired， making their families and friends most uncomfortable. I have noticed that there are over-strenuous people who have come to have an ideal of themselves as making an effort， and are most uneasy when this is not the case. To " being latent feel themselves no less " is quite impossible to them.
In our commercial and industrial life the somewhat feverish progress has generated a habit， a whole system of habits， based on the expectation of change. Enterprise and adaptability are cultivated at the expense of whatever conflicts with them； each one， feeling that the procession is moving on and that he must keep up with it， hurries along at the expense， perhaps， of health， culture and sanity.
This unrest is due rather to transition than to democracy； the ancient view that the latter is in its nature unstable being， as I have said， quite discredited. Even De Tocqueville， about 1835， saw that the political unrest of America was in minor affairs， and that a democratic polity might conceivably "render society more stationary than it has ever been in our western part of the world." [2] Tarde has expounded the matter at length and to much the same effect. A policy is stable when it is suited to prevailing conditions； and every year makes it more apparent that for peoples of European stock， at least， a (330) polity essentially democratic is the only one that can permanently meet this test.
A social group in which there is a fundamental harmony of forces resulting in effective cooperation may be said， I suppose， to be solidaire， to adopt a French word much used in this connection. Thus France with its comparetively homogeneous people has no doubt more solidarity 梟otwithstanding its dissensions梩han Austria； Eng land more than Russia， and Japan more than China.
But if one thinks closely about the question he will find it no easy matter to say in just what solidarity consists Not in mere likeness， certainly， since the difference of individuals and parts is not only consistent with but essential to a harmonious whole梐s the harmony of music is produced by differing but correlated sounds. We want what Burke described as " that action and counteraction， which in the natural and in the political world， from the reciprocal struggle of discordant powers draws out the harmony of the universe." [3]
So far as likeness is necessary it is apparently a likeness of essential ideas and， still more， of sentiments， appropriate to the activity in question.
Thus a Japanese writer explains the patriotic unity of his countrymen by their common devotion to the Mikado and the imperial family.
