Well-conducted sports are a lesson to every one that fair and orderly opposition may even promote good fellowship； and familiarity with them， in primary groups， is an excellent preparation for the friendly competition that ought to prevail in society at large. Indeed it is only through opposition that we learn to understand one another. In the moment of struggle the opposing agent may arouse anger， but afterward the mind， more at ease， (200) views with respect and interest that which has exhibited so much force. It seems evident， for instance， that the self-assertion of the wage-earning class， so far as it is orderly and pursuant of ideals which all classes share， has commanded not only the respect but the good will of the people at large. Weakness梚ntrinsic weakness， the failure of the member to assert its function梚s instinctively despised. I am so far in sympathy with the struggle for existence as to think that passive kindliness alone， apart from self-assertion， is a demoralizing ideal， or would be if it were likely to become ascendant. But the self which is asserted， the ideal fought for， must be a generous one？involving perhaps self-sacrifice as that is ordinarily understood梠r the struggle is degrading.
The wider contact which marks modern life， the suppling of the imagination which enables it to appreciate diverse phases of human nature， the more instructed sense of justice， brings in a larger good will which economizes personal hostility without necessarily diminishing opposition. In primitive life the reaction of man against man is crude， impulsive， wasteful. Violent anger is felt against the opponent as a whole and expressed by a general assault. Civilized man， trained to be more discriminating， strikes at tendencies rather than persons， and avoids so far as possible hostile emotion， which he finds painful and exhausting. As an opponent he is at once kinder and more formidable than the savage.
Perhaps the most urgent need of the present time， so far as regards the assuaging of antipathy， is some clearer consciousness of what may be called， in the widest sense， the rules of the game； that is， for accepted ideals of justice (201) which conscience and public opinion may impose upon reasonable men， and law upon the unreasonable. In the lack of clear notions of right and duty the orderly test of strength degenerates into a scuffle， in which the worst passions are released and low forms of power tend to prevail梛ust as brutal and tricky methods prevail in ill-regulated sports. We need a popular ethics which is at once Christian and evolutionary， recognizing unity of spirit alongside of diversity of standpoint； a cooperative competition， giving each individual， group or race a fair chance for higher self-assertion under conditions so just as to give the least possible occasion for ill-feeling.
Something of this sort is in fact the ideal in accordance with which modern democracy hopes to reconstruct a somewhat disordered world.
There is a French maxim， much quoted of late， to the effect that to understand all is to pardon all： all animosity， as some interpret this， is a mistake； when we fully understand we cease to blame. This， however， is only a half-truth， and becomes a harmful fallacy when it is made to stand for the whole. It is true that if we wholly lose ourselves in another's state of mind blame must disappear： perhaps nothing is felt as wrong by him who does it at the very instant it is done. But this is more than we have a right to do： it involves that we renounce our moral individuality， the highest part of our being， and become a mere intelligence. The fact that every choice is natural to the mind that chooses does not make it right.
The truth is that we must distinguish， in such questions as this， two attitudes of mind， the active and the con-(202)-templative， both natural and having important functions， but neither by itself sufficient. Pure contemplation sees things and their relations as a picture and with no sense of better or worse； it does not care； it is the ideal of science and speculative philosophy. lf one could be completely in this state of mind he would cease to be a self altogether. All active personality， and especially all sense of right and wrong， of duty， responsibility， blame， praise and the like， depend upon the mind taking sides and having particular desires and purposes.
The unhappiness of bad men， maintained by Socrates， depends upon their badness being brought home to them in conscience. If， because of their insensibility or lack of proper reproof， the error of their way is not impressed upon them， they have no motive to reform. The fact that the evil-doer has become such gradually， and does not realize the evil in him， is no reason why we should not blame him； it is the function of blame to make him and others realize it， to define evil and declare it in the sight of men. We may pardon the evil-doer when he is dead， or has sincerely and openly repented， not while he remains a force for wrong.
