12.If we reflect a little,we shall perceive,that,between these two states,there is not that explicit separation which these names,and these definitions might teach one,at first sight,to expect.It is with them as with light and darkness:however distinct the ideas may be,that are,at first mention,suggested by those names,the things themselves have no determinate bound to separate them.The circumstance that has been spoken of as constituting the difference between these two states,is the presence or absence of an habit of obedience.This habit,accordingly,has been spoken of simply as present (that is as being petfectly present)or,in other words,we have spoken as if there were a perfect habit of obedience,in the one case:it has been spoken of simply as absent (that is,as being perfectly absent)or,in other words,we have spoken as if there were no habit of obedience at all,in the other.But neither of these manners of speaking,perhaps,is strictly just.Few,in fact,if any,are the instances of this habit being perfectly absent;certainly none at all,of its being perfectly present.Governments accordingly,in proportion as the habit of obedience is more perfect,recede from,in proportion as it is less perfect,approach to,a state of nature:and instances may present themselves in which it shall be difficult to say whether a habit,perfect,in the degree in which,to constitute a government,it is deemed necessary it should be perfect,does subsist or not.(46)13.On these considerations,the supposition of a perfect state of nature,or,as it may be termed,a state of society perfectly natural,may,perhaps,be justly pronounced,what our Author for the moment seemed to think it,an extravagant supposition:but then that of a government in this sense perfect;or,as it may be termed,a state of society perfectly political,a state of perfect political union,a state of perfect submission in the subject,of perfect authority in the governor,is no less so.(47)14.A remark there is,which,for the more thoroughly clearing up of our notions on this subject,it may be proper here to make.To some ears,the phrases,`state of nature,'`state of political society,'may carry the appearance of being absolute in their signification:as if the condition of a man,or a company of men,in one of these states,or m the other,were a matter that depended altogether upon themselves.But this is not the case.To the expression `state of nature,'no more than to the expression `state of political society,'can any precise meaning be annexed,without reference to a party different from that one who is spoken of as being in the state in question.This will readily be perceived.The difference between the two states lies,as we have observed,in the habit of obedience.
With respect then to a habit of obedience,it can neither be understood as subsisting in any person,nor as not subsisting in any person,but with reference to some other person.For one party to obey,there must be another party that is obeyed.But this party who is obeyed,may at different times be different.Hence may one and the same party be conceived to obey and not to obey at the same time,so as it be with respect to different persons,or as we may say,to different objects of obedience.Hence it is,then,that one and the same party may be said to be in a state of nature,and not to be in a state of nature,and that at one and the same time,according as it is this or that party that is taken for the other object of comparison.
The case is,that in common speech,when no particular object of comparison is specified,all persons in general are intended:so that when a number of persons are said simply to be in a state of nature,what is understood is,that they are so as well with reference to one another,as to all the world.
15.In the same manner we may understand,how the same man,who is governor with respect to one man or set of men,may be subject with respect to another:
how among governors some may be in a perfect state of nature,with respect to each other:as the KINGS of FRANCE and SPAIN:others,again,in a state ofperfect subjection,as the HOSPODARS OF WALACHIA and MOLDAVIA with respect to the GRAND SIGNIOR:others,again,in a state of manifest but imperfect subjection,as the GERMAN States with respect to the EMPEROR:others,again,in such a state in which it may be difficult to determine whether they are in a state of imperfect subjection or in aperfect state of nature:
as the KING of NAPLES with respect to the POPE.(48)16.In the same manner,also,it may be conceived,without entering into details,how any single person,born,as all persons are,into a state of perfect subjection to his parents,that is into a state of perfect political society with respect to his parents,may from thence pass into a perfect state of nature;and from thence successively into any number of different states of political society more or less perfect,by passing into different societies.
17.In the same manner also it may be conceived how,in any political society,the same man may,with respect to the same individuals,be,at different periods,and on different occasions,alternately,in the state of governor and subject:to-day concurring,perhaps active,in the business of issuing a general command for the observance of the whole society,amongst the rest of another man in quality of Judge:to-morrow,punished,perhaps,by a particular command of that same Judge for not obeying the general command which he himself (I mean the person acting in character of governor)had issued.I need scarce remind the reader how happily this alternate state of authority and submission is exemplified among ourselves.
