Acceptance of the intuitions implies acceptance of all legitimate deductions.But this position is more fully 'drawn out'(in his favourite phrase)by Newman.It runs through a whole series of the writings in which the delicacy and subtlety of his style are most fully displayed,(242)and the difficulty of the position most fully exhibited.Chillingworth had stated the Protestant argument.To admit the infallibility of the Church,he had said,takes the individual no further,unless he is infallibly certain of the infallibility.To this Newman replies(243)that I may be certain without claiming infallibility.Certainty that two and two make four is quite consistent with a power of mathematical blundering.Perhaps it should rather be said that,if there be necessary truths,every one must,within their sphere,be infallible.But no one asserts that the infallibility of the Church is a necessary truth.If real,it is a concrete fact to be proved by appropriate evidence.After exhausting your eloquence in proving the fallibility,and indeed the inevitably sceptical result of 'private judgment,'you are bound to show how,in this case,the individual can attain certitude.The judgment that 'the Church is infallible'has been disputed by reasonable people.How are we to show that,in this case,their doubts are unreasonable,if not wicked?Why do not the proofs of the weakness of private judgment apply to this as to every other judgment?Have you not really cut away the foundation on which sooner or later your argument must be based?Yet certitude is made out to be a moral duty even for the average believer.
The theory is most explicitly worked out in the Grammar of Assent.Newman exerts all his skill in expounding a very sound doctrine.As a matter of fact,we form innumerable judgments by what he calls the 'illative sense';that is to say,not by formal argument,but by a complex system of 'implicit'reasonings.
'Logic,'as he says,'does not really prove.It enables us to join issue with others.it verifies negatively';and for 'genuine proof in concrete matter we require an organism more delicate,versatile,and elastic,than verbal argumentation.'(244)Logic is a chain which 'hangs loose at both ends,'(245)for the first principles must be assumed,and the abstract concept never fits the actual complexity of concrete fact.By the 'illative sense,'again,we reach innumerable truths.We hold that England is an island,or that the man whom we see is our brother,with a faith indistinguishable from absolute conviction.We go further;we believe that a friend is honest,or,say,that Caesar crossed the Rubicon,without admitting the slightest scruple of doubt.All knowledge whatever of fact plainly implies something different from formal logic;and,so far,the only question seems to be why so palpable a truth needs so elaborate and graceful an exposition.The answer is indicated by the polemic against Locke.Locke had proposed,as a test of a love of truth,the refusal to hold any proposition,with a greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant.'(246)The statement seems to be not only unassailable but in conformity with Newman's doctrine.Should we believe England to be an island?When Julius Caesar landed,it was not proved;and he would have been wrong to be certain.When did it become right to be certain?Surely at whatever moment it was adequately proved.It is never so proved that to deny it would be self-contradictory,but by this time it is as much proved as any fact can be proved.Locke would simply justify himself by saying that in this case our 'assurance'does not exceed the 'proofs on which it is built.'The approximation to demonstration is indefinitely close,though never absolute,and the difference becomes too small to be perceptible.A difficulty emerges only if we at once admit the rightness of belief and deny the sufficiency of the evidence.
Newman,having shown that we believe in concrete truths not proved by abstract logic,argues that we also assume many truths not proved even by sufficient empirical evidence.We have what Locke called a 'surplusage of assurance.'The fact,again,is undeniable.We believe implicitly in countless things upon insufficient evidence.This,as Locke would add,is one main explanation of the prevalence of error,and also a proof that error may be innocent.It is a duty to be candid;it cannot be a duty to be right.We must listen to reason;but the effect of reasoning must depend upon the constitution of our minds,and the various beliefs with which they are already stored.Now to Newman this doctrine always seems to be sceptical.It amounts to the 'liberalising'view that all creeds are equally good if only they be equally sincere.Hence he lays stress upon the doctrine that 'assent'is a volitional as well as an 'intellectual act.'It is our duty to obey the reason;and when the 'illative sense'declares the truth of a proposition,we are bound to an 'active recognition'of the truth.(247)Locke,on the contrary,holds that if we listen to reason,the assent follows automatically by a non-voluntary act.
On Newman's showing,an element of volition intrudes into logic.Belief belongs to action as well as to pure speculation.
'To act you must assume,'he says,'and that assumption is faith.'(248)If acting upon an hypothesis is the same thing as believing the truth to be demonstrated,this leads to a singular result.A judge,says Newman,acts upon the assumption that a criminal's guilt is proved.(249)Yet,as it is never mathematically demonstrated,he has a 'surplusage of assurance.'
