Mill thus appears to argue that theology is not as irrational as its defender supposes.The introduction of such predicates as infinite and absolute do not make knowledge of their subject impossible.It would have cleared the matter if Mill had gone on to explain his own view of the 'Absolute.'We may guess what he ought to have said in conformity with his principles.If all knowing is essentially a knowledge of relations,it is idle to seek for an 'absolute'in the sense of a thing which (on Mansel's definition)'exists in and by itself,having no necessary relations to any other being.'(97)Since,in saying anything about it,we assert a relation,we cannot even speak of such an 'absolute'without contradiction.'Absolute,'like certain,necessary,and so forth,is a name referring to our knowledge.An assertion about facts may be 'absolutely'true,however trifling the fact.It may be as absolutely true that a sparrow fell to the ground at 9A.M.on the 1st of January last as that the sun exists or that two and two make four.Knowledge implies not an 'absolute fact'but an 'absolute truth'--a truth which requires no qualification not explicitly given in the proposition asserted.To say that a thing exists absolutely is to add nothing but emphasis to the statement that it exists.Nor does the statement that it exists 'conditionally'alter the case.It is conditional in so far as it has a cause,or as from its existence we may infer some previous state of things.If,however,it exists,the conditions have ex hypothesi been fulfilled.It exists now 'absolutely,'however it came to exist.It is a part of the whole system of interdependent and continuous processes which make up the universe.(98)If we know that anything,then,is part of the actual world,we have all 'the absolute'required;and this is an 'absolute'which is perfectly compatible with any complexity of relations.The clue is given by getting hold of any bit whatever of the actual web,not by getting into some transcendental world beyond.The error of supposing that we must find an 'Absolute'somewhere,and that we cannot find it in any part of our experience,is the same as would be the error of supposing that because we cannot fix a point in absolute space,we cannot get any valid space measures.The centre of the sun or Greenwich observatory will do equally well,though we cannot even speak intelligibly of their absolute position in the universe.To give a scientific account of astronomy we do not require an absolute centre of space.This is what I take to be implied in Kant's argument about the idea of God.We cannot get to an 'absolute'Being outside of the universe,but the whole must be regarded as a single and self-supporting system.This argument is distorted in the elaborate argumentations of Hamilton and Mansel against the attempts to get to an absolute Being outside of things in general.Such an absolute as they attack is doubtless an absurdity;but neither are we,as they urge,compelled to believe in it.If we still use theological language,we must say that God is not a Being apart from the universe,but implied in the universe;the ground of all things,the immanent principle whose 'living raiment is the world.'Mill of course holds that we must abandon 'transcendentalism'or the search for 'things in themselves'outside of the phenomenal world.Mansel often seems to agree.Philosophers who indulge in these freaks try,he says,to lift up the curtain of their own being to view the picture which it conceals.'Like the painter of old,they knew not that the curtain is the picture.'(99)That sounds like good positivism or phenomenalism.It should give the death blow to all 'ontology.'He assures us over and over again that the 'Infinite'is a 'mere negation of thought';(100)that contradictions arise whenever we attempt to transcend the limits of experience;that human reason is so far from bring able to construct a 'Scientific Theology,independent of and superior to Revelation,that it cannot even read the alphabet out of which that Theology must be framed.'(101)We can know the laws of nature or the phenomena,but we can know nothing of the substance or noumenon which lies behind them.Then,is the natural query,why not leave it out of account altogether?Why venture into this region,where,as Mansel admits,we find only 'antinomies'or,'contradictory inconceivables'?Why not,in short,be agnostics like Mr Herbert Spencer,who based his First Principles on the Hamilton-Mansel doctrine?This gives the secret of the whole procedure.
'The cardinal point,'says Mansel,'of Sir W.Hamilton's philosophy.is the absolute necessity,under any system of philosophy whatever,of acknowledging the existence of a sphere of belief,beyond the limits of the sphere of thought.'(102)Faith,then,remains when reason disappears,though faith cannot solve the doubts suggested by reason.(103)What 'faith'tells us,in fact,is that we must believe one of two propositions,though we cannot conceive the possibility of either.Can it possibly,we ask,much matter whether we believe that there is or is not an X of whom nothing more can be intelligibly said?Abelief which extends beyond 'the sphere of thought'is a belief which we can afford to leave to itself.But Mansel has to declare that we are forced to believe where we cannot even properly think.'We are compelled by the constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an absolute and infinite Being,'(104)though,as we learn,to 'think of the infinite'is really a negation of thought.A decision to accept one of the contradictory beliefs is yet of the highest practical importance.
